



THIS GUY


This guy here? This Kronos, embodiment of time? This guy is messing with me. When I wake up, he's there. When I go to bed, he's there. When I die, he'll be there. This guy is everywhere and everywhen and everywhen and everywhen and it feels like there's nothing I can to do stop him.

And yet, when ruminating, I can see clearly what it is to stop Kronos from being such a T-boy: I can squish him. It's true that clock time lies beyond even my grasp, and yet strategic time remains my plaything alone-a conception of time similar enough to realtime for me to understand it, but different enough from realtime for me to maintain analytic control over it. And by "maintain analytic control," I mean "squish the ever-lasting skatá out of this dude Kronos." You may be here, kind sir, but you may not matter. I can see you and ignore you at the same time, thank you very much. Now go blow dry that thing you call a beard, and mind the split ends.

I realize that we will eventually have to respect Kronos, but given that he went after a hallucination of my dog, I'm not feeling the need to come correct just yet. I'm pretty sure I want to hit my personal pause button and bring things back to where I understand them. If we fail to do that, we run the risk of misunderstanding the difference between strategic tension and the way that tension manifests in the context of institutions (or non-institutions, for that matter). If we can't squish Kronos, then we are his toy; if we can squish him, he is ours.

I SQUISH YOU, FATHER TIME

PART 1 TIME TO VOTE



I was asleep on the couch in that half-awake-half-asleep world you live in after too much cold medicine. The news were on, so I overheard what I think was a vote in the Prytaneion about whether the senators ought to receive a raise. Three things seem to motivate what's going on here: first, the senators all want raises; second, senators don't want to get caught voting for their own raises; and third, they typically vote in order by region. I didn't hear what was going on with all nine senators, but I did catch the last three before rolling over and dozing back off. It was a tie by the time we got here, anyway.

We'll say that a senator's favorite outcome is getting a raise without having to vote for it; their second favorite outcome is getting a raise but having to vote for it; their third favorite outcome is not getting a raise without voting for it; and their least favorite outcome is not getting a raise but getting caught voting for it. The interaction is depicted above with all of the correct happiness point in there already.


So let's think already!

- 1. Which outcomes are Pareto optimal?
- 2. Squish the game into a strategic form game; have Voter 1 be rows, Voter 2 be columns, and Voter 3 be matrices.
- 3. Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria and provide substantive interpretations.
- 4. Consider the following claim: a strategy profile of the squished game is a pure-strategy Nash equilbirum if and only if it features unanimous voting. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?
- 5. Consider the following claim: a strategy profile of the squished game is a pure-strategy Nash equilbrium if and only if the legislators get a raise. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?
- 6. Consider the following claim: a strategy profile of the squished game is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it is Pareto optimal. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?

necessary for **PASS**: get 4

PART 2 HOT POTATO


Apparently voting for raises is a reasonaly new phenomenon among those dimwitted Hestallans: time was that they employed a rather archaic way of dividing the monies allocated for government. They would hold run-off elections until the nine senators coalesced into two camps. They then would play a public game of "pass the buck:" the first coalition would decide whether to keep one drachma (ending the interaction) or pass the buck to the second coalition. From there, the second coalition could ether keep two drachmae or split the proceeds evenly.



Just to get our bearings:

- 1. Which outcomes are Pareto optimal?
- 2. Squish the game into a strategic form game.
- 3. Identify all Nash equilbria of the game (in pure or mixed strategies).
- 4. Evaluate the following claim: a strategy profile in the squished game is a Nash equilbrium if and only if it is Pareto dominated. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?
- 5. How many equilbria does the squished game have?

Naturally, political theater like this gets better as you make it longer-otherwise, how will we keep citizens' attention for an entire 24-hour news cycle?! So, it was decided to add more money to the pool and to add another full round of the interaction. Each time a coalition passed to the other coalition, more money went into the public pot. But, each round also meant that the incentive to take got tastier and tastier. Consider the two-round version below.



Now it's a party!


- 6. Which outcomes are Pareto optimal?
- 7. Squish the game into a strategic form game.
- 8. Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilbria of the squished game.
- 9. Evaluate the claim: a strategy profile of the squished game is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it features no delay. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?

necessary for **PASS**: get 6 sufficient for one **ALMA**: get 9

sufficient for another **ALMA**: suppose the game continued on this way ad infinitum. How do your answers to Questions 6–9 respond in kind?



But things are even stranger here in the Olympia Prytaneion-we still haven't quite figured out how best to compensate the global senators! There's been a long-standing debate between the Cosmopolitans and the Politans on such matters. Frankly, I think the only thing standing between us and Total Cosmopolitan Domination is the media!



i have such a headache

- 1. Which strategy profiles are Pareto optimal?
- 2. In no more than a few sentences, describe what the Politans can and cannot see.
- 3. Now squish the game into strategic form; let the Cosmopolitans choose rows, the Media choose columns, and the Politans choose matrices.
- 4. Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
- 5. Assess the claim: a strategy profile is a pure-strategy Nash equilbrium of the squished game if and only if it is Pareto optimal. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?
- 6. Assess the claim: a strategy profile is a pure-strategy Nash equilbrium of the squished game if and only if the Media remains Silent. If so, why? If not, can you weaken the claim?